Simple adaptive strategies : from regret-matching to uncoupled dynamics /

This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to corre...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full text (MCPHS users only)
Main Author: Hart, Sergiu
Other Authors: Mas-Colell, Andreu
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Singapore : World Scientific, 2013
Series:World Scientific series in economic theory ; v. 4.
Subjects:
Local Note:ProQuest Ebook Central

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000ui 4500
001 in00000091502
006 m o d
007 cr |n|||||||||
008 130428s2013 si a ob 001 0 eng d
005 20240626183133.1
016 7 |a 016143853  |2 Uk 
019 |a 841913825  |a 1086408434  |a 1237227309 
020 |a 9814390704  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9789814390705  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |z 9789814390699 
020 |z 9814390690 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000052916781 
029 1 |a DEBBG  |b BV043037545 
029 1 |a DEBBG  |b BV044174608 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 381319083 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 421263938 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 454998414 
035 |a (OCoLC)841229571  |z (OCoLC)841913825  |z (OCoLC)1086408434  |z (OCoLC)1237227309 
035 |a (OCoLC)ocn841229571 
040 |a YDXCP  |b eng  |e pn  |c YDXCP  |d OCLCO  |d N$T  |d STF  |d UKMGB  |d OCLCF  |d DEBSZ  |d GGVRL  |d OCLCQ  |d MHW  |d OCLCQ  |d AGLDB  |d MERUC  |d OCLCQ  |d ZCU  |d NJR  |d U3W  |d OCLCQ  |d VTS  |d ICG  |d INT  |d OCLCQ  |d WYU  |d OCLCQ  |d DKC  |d AU@  |d OCLCQ  |d UKAHL  |d OL$  |d OCLCQ  |d K6U  |d LEAUB  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCL  |d SXB 
050 4 |a QA270  |b .H37 2013 
072 7 |a MAT  |x 011000  |2 bisacsh 
082 0 4 |a 519.3  |2 23 
100 1 |a Hart, Sergiu. 
245 1 0 |a Simple adaptive strategies :  |b from regret-matching to uncoupled dynamics /  |c Sergiu Hart, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, Andreu Mas-Colell, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona ; with the collaboration of Yakov Babichenko, Amotz Cahn, Yishay Mansour, David Schmeidler. 
264 1 |a Singapore :  |b World Scientific,  |c [2013] 
300 |a 1 online resource (xxxviii, 296 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a World Scientific series in economic theory,  |x 2251-2071 ;  |v vol. 4 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 |a Ch. 1. Existence of correlated equilibria / Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler -- ch. 2. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium / Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell -- ch. 3. A general class of adaptive strategies / Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell -- ch. 4. A reinforcement procedure leading to correlated equilibrium / Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell -- ch. 5. Regret-based continuous-time dynamics / Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell -- ch. 6. General procedures leading to correlated equilibria / Amotz Cahn -- ch. 7. Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium / Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell -- ch. 8. Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium / Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell -- ch. 9. Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria / Yakov Babichenko -- ch. 10. How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures / Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour -- ch. 11. Adaptive heuristics / Sergiu Hart -- ch. 12. Nash equilibrium and dynamics / Sergiu Hart. 
520 |a This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding - boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run - generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other's payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of "regret"). Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses - in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering - and for further research. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
650 0 |a Games of strategy (Mathematics) 
650 0 |a Heuristic algorithms. 
700 1 |a Mas-Colell, Andreu. 
758 |i has work:  |a Simple adaptive strategies (Text)  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGYcb9byBqQYwmkf74999P  |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |z 9789814390699  |z 9814390690  |w (DLC) 2012023203 
830 0 |a World Scientific series in economic theory ;  |v v. 4. 
852 |b E-Collections  |h ProQuest 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcphs/detail.action?docID=1168135  |z Full text (MCPHS users only)  |t 0 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH25076636 
938 |a EBSCOhost  |b EBSC  |n 564500 
938 |a Cengage Learning  |b GVRL  |n GVRL8RCU 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 7640093 
947 |a FLO  |x pq-ebc-base 
999 f f |s 5be9f2d3-7504-4296-8c2b-d820cf2a4a13  |i b7302bf6-9fd7-4efc-93ac-45320caeeb1c  |t 0 
952 f f |a Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences  |b Online  |c Online  |d E-Collections  |t 0  |e ProQuest  |h Other scheme 
856 4 0 |t 0  |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcphs/detail.action?docID=1168135  |y Full text (MCPHS users only)