Judicial reform as political insurance : Argentina, Peru, and Mexico in the 1990s /
"During the 1990s, judicial reform swept Latin America. Why do some instances of judicial reform appear lead to the development of a powerful judiciary while others have failed to do so? In her careful analysis, Finkel shows that while ruling parties can be induced to initiate judicial reforms...
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| Online Access: |
Full text (MCPHS users only) |
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Notre Dame, Ind. :
University of Notre Dame Press,
2008
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| Subjects: | |
| Local Note: | ProQuest Ebook Central |
| Summary: | "During the 1990s, judicial reform swept Latin America. Why do some instances of judicial reform appear lead to the development of a powerful judiciary while others have failed to do so? In her careful analysis, Finkel shows that while ruling parties can be induced to initiate judicial reforms (constitutional revisions), they often prove unwilling to implement these constitutional changes (by enacting required legislation). However, ruling parties that believe they are unlikely to maintain political power have a strong rationale for implementing meaningful judicial reform as an "insurance policy." Finkel's research suggests that as the ruling party's probability of reelection declines, the likelihood of reforms that result in an empowered judiciary increases."--Jacket. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (x, 157 pages) |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-152) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780268079635 0268079633 |
| Source of Description, Etc. Note: | Print version record. |
