Command And Control Mechanisms In The Chickamauga Campaign.
This thesis analyzes how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, employed the command and control mechanisms available to him as he maneuvered his army from Tullahoma, Tennessee toward Chattanooga, Tennessee in August-September, 1863. It also analyzes how these m...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
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San Francisco :
Pickle Partners Publishing,
2015
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| Local Note: | ProQuest Ebook Central |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Baker, Philip J. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Command And Control Mechanisms In The Chickamauga Campaign. |
| 260 | |a San Francisco : |b Pickle Partners Publishing, |c 2015. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (96 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 500 | |a "Text originally published in 1989 under the same title." | ||
| 500 | |a UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a TABLE OF CONTENTS; ABSTRACT; LIST OF FIGURES; CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION; CHAPTER 2-COMMAND AND CONTROL; The Nature of Command and Control; Command and Control in the American Civil War; The United States Military Telegraph; The United States Army Signal Corps; Couriers; CHAPTER 3-THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND; The Commanders; Command and Control Assets; CHAPTER 4-MOVEMENT TO THE TENNESSEE RIVER; CHAPTER 5-MOVEMENT FROM THE TENNESSEE RIVER TO CONSOLIDATION AT MCLEMORE'S COVE; CHAPTER 6-ACTIONS THROUGH SEPTEMBER 20, 1863; CHAPTER 7-CONCLUSIONS; BIBLIOGRAPHY; BOOKS; GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS; ARTICLES. | |
| 520 | |a This thesis analyzes how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, employed the command and control mechanisms available to him as he maneuvered his army from Tullahoma, Tennessee toward Chattanooga, Tennessee in August-September, 1863. It also analyzes how these mechanisms were employed during the battle of Chickamauga itself, on 19-20 September, 1863. General Rosecrans possessed three mechanisms for commanding and controlling his army. The first was the military telegraph, provided by the quasi-military U.S. Military Telegraph service. Next were the assets of the fledgling U.S. Signal Corps, which consisted of signal flags and torches, and a portable version of the telegraph. Finally, there were couriers, who were usually mounted, and were provided by subordinate unit details, or by units specifically formed for courier duty. The thesis concludes that General Rosecrans did not use his command and control mechanisms effectively. Rosecrans relied too heavily on couriers to carry messages over densely wooded, cross-compartmented terrain in order to send orders to his widely dispersed subordinates and receive information from them. While Rosecrans made wide use of the military telegraph, including using it during the battle itself, he did not effectively use his Signal Corps assets. These assets were used essentially as static observation posts, and only to a limited degree as a means for effecting command and control. The thesis further concludes, however, that General Rosecrans use of command and control assets was not a decisive factor in the outcome of the campaign or battle. While his reliance upon courier assets added significantly to the time required to obtain information and send orders, it was not the reason for the Union defeat at Chickamauga. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central College Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Command and control systems |x History. | |
| 651 | 0 | |a United States |x History |y Civil War, 1861-1865. | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Command and control mechanisms in the chickamauga campaign: the union experience (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCY4r4gmCGJyPfRm8thVFqP |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Baker Jr., Major Philip J. |t Command And Control Mechanisms In The Chickamauga Campaign: The Union Experience. |d San Francisco : Golden Springs Publishing, ©2015 |
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