Comparative Constitutional Design.
Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.
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Full text (MCPHS users only) |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012
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| Series: | Comparative constitutional law and policy.
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| Subjects: | |
| Local Note: | ProQuest Ebook Central |
Table of Contents:
- Cover; COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Contributors; Acknowledgments; 1: Introduction; ANTECEDENTS; THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE; OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; PART I: Design Processes; 2: Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making; INTRODUCTION; ENHANCING IMPARTIALITY; ENHANCING RATIONAL BELIEF FORMATION; REDUCING THE IMPACT OF INTEREST; REDUCING THE IMPACT OF PASSION; REDUCING COGNITIVE BIAS; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; 3: Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?; INTRODUCTION; LITERATURE ON CASES.
- CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MODES, ACTORS, AND CONSTRAINTSCONNECTING PROCESS AND OUTCOME:MICRO-FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS; HYPOTHESES AND EVIDENCE LINKING PROCESSES TO OUTCOMES; Institutional Self-Dealing; International Actors; Public Participation and Oversight; CONCLUSION; LITERATURE CITED; PART II: How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions; 4: Democratization and Countermajoritarian Institutions: Power and Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy; INTRODUCTION; COUNTERMAJORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS AND SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIZATION; THE MODEL; Model 1; Payoffs; Analysis.
- Model 2Payoffs; Analysis; IMPLICATIONS; APPLYING THE APPROACH: CHILE, 1973-PRESENT; Mutual Restraint: Governance under the 1980 Constitution; CONCLUSIONS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; 5: The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility; INTRODUCTION; PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY; KINGS AGAINST PARLIAMENTS; CONSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES; APPENDIX: HISTORICAL PATHS; Principle Not Tested, Dynasty Deposed or Monarchy Abolished; Never Lost; Rotation; Suppress, Dynasty Deposed or Monarchy Abolished; Yield, Survive; Yield, Overthrown; Suppress, Survive; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES.
- 6: Social Foundations of China's Living ConstitutionFROM THE QING TO NEW CHINA TO NEW NEW CHINA: QING, REPUBLICAN AND SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONS, AND BEYOND; THE 1982 CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS: FROM A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY TO A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY, FROM A REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TO A GOVERNING PARTY; THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE OPERATIONOF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER; Horizontal Power Issues; Vertical Power Issues; Constitutional Litigation and the Protection of Individual Rights; CHINA'S LIVING CONSTITUTION: SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONALISMWITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS.
- THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINAREFERENCES; 7: The Political Economy of Constitutionalism in a Non-Secularist World; CO-OPTATION; JURISDICTIONAL ADVANTAGES; THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGITIMATION OF RADICALRELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION; POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY; CONCLUSION; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; REFERENCES; PART III: Issues in Institutional Design; 8: Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem; CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, DIFFICULTY AND SCALE:THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS; THE DATA ON AMENDMENT RATES AND DENOMINATORS.
