Economics of the Law : Torts, Contracts, Property and Litigation.
Over the past two decades, the field of law and economics has matured to the point where scholars have employed the latest economic methods in an effort to understand the nature of legal rules and to guide legal reform. This book is the first to provide a broad survey of this scholarship as it has b...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
1997
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| Local Note: | ProQuest Ebook Central |
Table of Contents:
- ONE: Introduction; 1. Efficiency Concepts; 2. The Coase Theorem; 3. Themes; 4. Plan of the Book; TWO: The Economics of Tort Law: The Basic Model; 1. The Basic Accident Model; 2. The Hand Rule and Causation; 3. Individualized versus Average Standards: The Reasonable Person; 4. Activity Levels and Accident Risk; 5. Issues in the Determination of Damages; 6. Summary; THREE: The Economics of Tort Law: Extensions; 1. Litigation Costs; 2. The Impact of Uncertainty About Legal Standards, Causation, and Risk; 3. Sequential Care Torts and Strategic Behavior; 4. Summary.
- FOUR: The Economics of Contract Law: Remedies for Breach1. Court-Imposed Damage Remedies; 2. Risk Sharing and Remedies for Breach; 3. Asymmetric Information and Limited Liability for Breach; 4. Liquidated Damages; 5. Specific Performance; 6. Summary; FIVE: The Economics of Contract Law: Mistake, Impossibility, and Other Doctrines; 1. Offer, Acceptance, and Consideration; 2. Formation Defenses; 3. Performance Excuses; 4. Contract Modification: The Preexisting Duty Rule; 5. Summary; SIX: The Economics of Property Law; 1. Property Rules and Liability Rules.
- 2. Controlling Externalities: Formal Analysis3. Land Transfer; 4. Summary; SEVEN: Government Taking and Regulation of Private Property; 1. The Economics of Eminent Domain; 2. Regulation and Takings; 3. Summary; EIGHT: The Economics of Litigation and Settlement; 1. The Differing Perceptions Model; 2. The Asymmetric Information Model; 3. The Impact of Different Cost-Allocation Rules; 4. Discovery; 5. Application: The Decision of Repeat Defendants to Employ in-House Counsel or an Outside Attorney; 6. Summary; NINE: The Economics of Frivolous Litigation; 1. The Differing Perceptions Model.
- 2. The Legal Error Model3. The Timing of Litigation Costs; 4. The Asymmetric Information Model; 5. Summary; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z.
