Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? /
The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; i...
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Full text (MCPHS users only) |
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| Main Author: | |
| Corporate Authors: | , |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute,
2006
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| Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/64. |
| Subjects: | |
| Local Note: | ProQuest Ebook Central |
